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Abstract
Empirical studies show that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is larger than one in developed countries but smaller in developing
countries. This paper develops a production function which allows for this
structure in the elasticity of substitution. The case of a falling real interest
rate and capital deepening in the developed countries in the presence of FDI
flows from the developed to the developing country is analyzed. It is shown
that this structure in the elasticity of substitution can be responsible for a U-
shaped relationship between the capital intensity of the developed country and
the relative capital intensity of the developing country. This carries over to an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the capital intensity of the developed
country and FDI profitability.
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1 Introduction
While current research in explaining FDI patterns is heavily focussed on heterogene-
ity of firms and industries with respect to productivity and sector or firm size (see
e.g. the recent review of the literature in Helpman 2006), this paper looks from a
more macroeconomic point of view onto the phenomenon of FDI. Its main argument
relies on the heterogeneity of the elasticity of substitution between capital and la-
bor among different countries and the development of the real interest rate. When
looking at developed and less developed countries (see e.g. Duffy and Papageorgiou
2000 or Pereira 2002) it seems that more developed countries are characterized by
an elasticity of substitution above one while developing countries have an elasticity
below one. This together with a falling real interest rate and capital deepening1
in the developed country over a longer time horizon can give rise to an inverted
U-shaped pattern in FDI flows as will be argued below.
Working out the determinants of FDI from the theoretical point of view, Helpman
(2006) broughtly distinguishes between reasons related to productivity heterogene-
ity and incomplete contracts. The latter is not the focus of the present paper.
Regarding the first argument, the main theoretical contribution to the literature is
the Melitz (2003) model with monopolistic competition and heterogenous firms on
which a large strand of the subsequent literature is build on 2. Subsequent developed
models took account of more complex firm strategies involved in FDI as horizontal
and vertical integration strategies or export platform structures3 (e.g. Yeaple 2003).
This literature points on several issues touching upon the firm’s decision of whether
to pursue FDI or not. From this theoretical point of view, the main results are that
more productive and larger firms are engaged in trade and FDI compared to firms
1With capital deepening an increase in the ratio of capital and labor used in production is meant
here.
2E.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Grossmam, Helpman and Szeidl (2005).
3Horizontal FDI corresponds to the situation where a firm serves the foreign market by producing
the final good in an own foreign facility, whereas vertical FDI means that intermediate input factors
for production of the final good are produced in an own foreign facility. Export platform FDI involves
production in a foreign country to serve other countries with products.
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which serve only their domestic market. This finding is concordance with empirical
findings. The knowledge capital model developed by Markusen, Venables, Eby-
Konan and Zhang (1996) and Markusen (1997) added to the literature by focusing
on factor proportions in a two factor model economy. Also, a rich environment of
different types of FDI was included. Solving these and subsequent models by simu-
lations provided insights into the relationship between FDI and factor proportions4,
i.e. how differences in factor proportions favor different types of FDI5.
A recent review of empirical studies searching for determinants of FDI can be found
in Blonigen (2006). He broughtly groups these into two categories. Firm level studies
trying to find correlations between firm specific characteristics and firm specific FDI
behavior and more macro economic oriented general equilibrium studies trying to
find correlations between country or region characteristics or exogenous macro eco-
nomic variables and FDI inflows. Firm level studies point to the importance of own
intangible assets and access to other’s intangible assets as well as firm size and pro-
ductivity (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). Macroeconomic general equilibrium
studies point to the importance of exchange rates, taxes, uncertainty, agglomeration
effects and tariffs as noted by Markusen and Maskus (2001) (For a list of references
see Markusen and Maskus 2001).
It seems remarkable that capital is absent in almost all the papers and articles cited
above, the only factor of production considered by these models is labor. Also the
The issue of heterogeneity in factor substitutability and the interest rate seem to be
hardly recognized by the literature on FDI.
The model below therefore aims to add to the theoretical literature on determinants
of FDI by taking account of the difference in the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor across developed and developing countries. The case analyzed in
this paper is that of a falling real interest rate over a longer period of time and a
thereby induced increase in the capital/labor ratio, i.e. capital deepening. The lower
4Factors that are recognized are skilled and unskilled labor, capital however is not present in
these models.
5The knowledge capital model was subsequently tested empirically in Carr, Markusen and
Maskus (2001).
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degree of substitutability of capital and labor in developing countries implies, ceteris
paribus, a slighter increase in the capital/labor ratio. However, different products
in the model are not perfect substitutes and the declining relative capital/labor ra-
tio in the developing country induces increasing prices for goods produced there.
This counteracts the above effect and even dominates it from some point in time
inducing convergence between countries. Therefore a U-shaped relationship between
the capital/labor ratio of the developed country and the relative capital/labor ratio
of the developing country emerges. There are two kinds of investments analyzed
in this paper. The first is portfolio investment by which investment flows by ordi-
nary investors are meant which are subject to local productivity in creating capital
goods for production. The local relative productivity is assumed to be lower in the
developing country. The second is foreign direct investment originating from the
developed country which refers to the situation where a particular firm can create
its on capital goods for investment abroad by using its relatively higher productivity.
The aforementioned U-shaped profile in the relative capital intensity of the devel-
oping country drives a wedge between the marginal product of portfolio and direct
investments which can cause an inverted U-shaped relationship in FDI profitability.
It also has serious implications for inequality across countries.
Desroches and Francis (2007) among others have documented that during at least the
last 15 years the real interest rates in developed countries were falling. During the
same period of time FDI inflows around the world grew heavily (see e.g. UNCTAD
2006) by more than GDP did. Also this evidence might be only suggestive, the
paper might be of general interest because a falling interest rate accompanied with
a rising capital intensity are the general characteristics of the adjustment process to
a steady state in the growth process of an economy (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
2003).
The basic framework is somewhat similar to the one presented in Helpman (1985)
where differentiated products can be produced by MNEs either in the home or the
host country and are sold simultaneously in both markets. Helpman (1985) terms
this as “horizontally integrated multinationals” but Markusen and Maskus (2001)
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point to the difference of this setup to what is usually referred to as horizontal FDI.
The model in this paper does not aim to give a contribution on the question why
horizontal FDI between similar countries occurs. Instead the focus is only on dif-
ferent countries motivated by the observation that less developed countries poses a
lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Exactly this observation
is the motivation for this paper and, hence, this paper elaborates on isolated effect
of this difference which can only be observed between different countries on FDI
flows.
The model thus fits more into the category of early contributions to the FDI litera-
ture which tries to explain FDI behavior by differences in factor proportions starting
with the contribution of Helpman (1984).
2 Theoretical Background
The CES function developed in Arrow et al. (1961) as a solution to the partial
differential equation defining the constant elasticity of substitution
σ =
f ′(k)[f(k)− kf ′(k)]
−kf ′′(k)f(k)
takes the form
f(k) = γ1[k
σ−1
σ + γ2]
σ
σ−1 .
k is defined as capital per efficiency unit of labor, k = KAL , where K is the capital
stock, L is raw labor and A might be interpreted as human capital or the state of a
purely labor augmenting technology. f(k) is the intensive form of a constant returns
to scale production function for final output Y , Y = F (AL,K). f ′(k) and f ′′(k)
denote first and second derivatives with respect to k. Finally γ1 and γ2 are arbi-
trary constants of integration. De la Grandville (1989) introduced the normalized
CES function through determination of these two constants from initial conditions
on production. It is important to note that “initial” is not to be interpreted in
terms of time, but in terms of some baseline values for production. If the economy
departs from this baseline, the elasticity of substitution is given by σ. The initial
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condition were given by k0, µ0 and y0, i.e. the baseline capital intensity, the baseline
marginal rate of substitution between labor and capital and the baseline production
per efficiency unit of labor. For γ1 and γ2 this implies
γ1 = y0
k
1
σ−1
0
k0 + µ0
,
γ2 = µ0k
− 1
σ
0 ,
µ0 =
f(k0)− k0f ′(k0)
f ′(k0)
.
The resulting normalized production function in intensive form is then given by
f(k) = y0
k 1σ0 + µ0
k0 + µ0
 σσ−1  k 1σ0
k
1
σ
0 + µ0
k
σ−1
σ
0 +
µ0
k
1
σ
0 + µ0
 σσ−1 .
This production function was subsequently used by, among others, Klump and De la
Grandville (2000), Klump and Preissler (2000), Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2003)
and Aquilina, Klump and Pietrobelli (2006).
An innovative production function can be obtained from these result by explicitly
specifying µ0 and y0. The economic intuition behind this that the baseline values of
production correspond to a situation where the economy is in an optimal position
to use the available technology, i.e. if the capital intensity equals k0, production
possibilities are better than with k 6= k0. One way to formalize this idea is to use
the specifications:
µ0 =
α
1− αk
σ−1
σ
− σ˜−1
σ˜
0 ,
y0 =
[
(1− α)k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
] σ˜
σ˜−1
. (1)
This results in the production function
f(k) =
[
(1− α)k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
] σ˜
σ˜−1(1− σ˜−1σ˜ σσ−1)
[
(1− α)
(
k
k0
)σ−1
σ
k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
] σ
σ−1
(2)
in intensive form6. If k equals k0, this function reduces to y0 given by (1) above.
This implies that at k = k0 the elasticity of substitution equals σ˜ and for k 6= k0 it
is given by σ.
6A somehow related production function appears in Jones (2003), where the baseline production
is restricted to the Cobb-Douglas case. For the empirical relevance of this specific function see also
Antony (2008).
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3 The Model
This section uses the production function (2) to construct an economy consisting
of two countries, one developed and one developing. The developed country is
assumed to set the technology standard defined by the production technology. There
is a continuum of differentiated products and producers located in the developed
country can contract out production to the developing country or engage via FDI in
producing in the developing country. Contracted out production is pursued by a local
producer who uses capital goods produced with local productivity using portfolio
investments while FDI financed production can make use of capital goods produced
by direct investors using the higher productivity of the developed country. The rate
of return to portfolio investments equals the interest rate obtained from ordinary
investments in the developing country while the rate of return to direct investments
is higher due to the assumption that only one firm active in the developed country
has the knowledge to provide the developing country with direct investments. Since
goods are imperfect substitutes this firm is in the position of a monopolist who faces
competition only from portfolio investors who have a comparative disadvantage in
producing capital goods. The rate of return on portfolio investments is assumed
to be exogenously given an the reaction of the model economy to changes in the
interest rate in analyzed.
3.1 Production
A firm i in the developed country is faced with the production possibilities given by
the production function in (2), where ki is the capital intensity of the ith firm given
by KiAiLi . Ki denotes the capital stock and Li the labor input of firm i. Ai is a labor
augmenting factor which is assumed to be identical for all firms in the developed
country, i.e. Ai = A.
The firm faces an exogenous interest rate of r and can choose among production
possibilities by choosing the value of k0, the base line value for the capital intensity
in production. Since at the point ki = k0 the elasticity of substitution is larger
than elsewhere it is cost minimizing to choose this value for k0. As Ai is identical
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for all firms in the developing country, they will all choose the same k0. Hencefor-
ward, k0 denotes the capital intensity of the developed country which is exogenously
determined by the interest rate. The price for the good produced by the firms is
normalized to one and thus r represents the measure for the real interest rate in
terms of the developed country good7. This interest rate determines k and in turn
k0 = k which are identical for all firms in the developed country. Following the
empirical evidence, it is assumed that σ˜ > 1 > σ, and hence the firms in the devel-
oped country operate at an elasticity of substitution above one. Due to symmetry
between firms i, Ki = K and Li = L.
A firm can decide to also produce in the developing country by either contracting
out its production or by investing directly into that country and building up an own
production unit. However, the goods produced in the developing country are not
perfect substitutes for the goods produced in the developed country. It is assumed
that consumers have preferences over the different goods given by
U =
(∫ 1
2
0
yδi di+
∫ 1
1
2
yδjdj
) 1
δ
, (3)
where ξ = 11−δ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between different goods.
Goods are not perfect substitutes but neither variant is essential for the consumers.
There is a set of measure 12 goods produced in the developed country and a corre-
sponding mass of 12 produced in the developing country indexed by j reflecting the
above assumption that each producer can produce via FDI or contracting out in the
developing country.
The developing country differs from the developed country with respect to the labor
augmenting factor. Labor is less productive there so that every firm has a specific
augmenting factor Aj < A in producing the corresponding good j in the developing
country. The capital intensity for the firm j in this country is therefore defined
analogously as in the developed country as KjAjLj .
7This simplifies the analysis. Alternatively one could define the real interest rate by dividing by
a price index over developed and developing countries’ goods according to the consumption index
below with the same results.
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There is a difference whether this good is produced by a local firm under contract
with the producer in the developed country or when production takes place after
this producer has directly invested in the developing country. This difference is with
respect to the capital goods which form Kj used in production. Denote investments
directed to firm j by Ij made by consumers from foregone consumption. Then capital
goods are produced according to Kj =
Aj
A Ij in the case of contracting out. This
reflects that if local producers have to build up the necessary facilities meeting the
technical standard of the developed country the face frictions caused by the lower
labor augmenting factor of their workers, i.e. they have difficulties in producing
capital goods that are in conjecture with the technology standards. However, if
the firm i from the developed country does this investment, it does not have these
difficulties. This firm can use its specific knowledge to produce the necessary capital
goods according to its local production function Kj = Ij and can invest them into
the local facility in the developing country. This is similar as in Acemoglu et al.
(2006) where the difference in the ability of producing capital goods is determined
by differences in technology and the distance to the technology frontier. From a
broader perspective this assumption implies that direct investors have a comparative
advantage compared to portfolio investors.
This structure implies that in the first case the local producer as an contractor has
to pay an effective interest rate of AAj r if investments yield the same return in both
countries. If capital is employed up to the point where its marginal product equals
the effective interest rate, the capital intensity is determined by
r = pj
Aj
A
f ′(kj), (4)
where pj is the price for good j and f ′(kj) is the first derivative of (2) at the point
kj . If pj
Aj
A differs from one, kj is unequal to k = k0 and the local producer is not at
the base line value of production implying an elasticity of substitution of σ < 1.
In the second case, the producer of the capital goods Kj can directly invest them in
the developing country by lending them to the local facility. Since the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor falls short of one in all cases where kj = k0,
he will charge a price as high as possible. The limit price is AAj r at which the
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local facility will be indifferent between being the contractor or the object of FDI.
However, to be able to invest directly the investor needs a local representative, e.g.
to observe its local investments, which causes fixed costs in terms of local labor.
Let these fixed costs be given by µwj , where wj is the wage paid in the developing
country and µ is a positive parameter. Thus net profits for the direct investor are
given by
pii = pj
(
A
Aj
− 1
)
rkjAjLj − µwj . (5)
3.2 Capital Deepening
This section draws attention to the scenario where real interest rates are falling
and hence the capital intensity in the developed country increases. This can be
directly read off the marginal product condition for all firms in the developed country,
r = f ′(k0). No arbitrage in the investment sector of the economy implies together
with (4)
f ′(k) = pj
Aj
A
f ′(kj). (6)
Whether the capital intensity kj increases depends on the development of the price
pj . Assume that prices equal marginal cost, the first order condition for wages
wj = pjAj
(
f(kj)− f ′(kj)kj
)
, (7)
can be used together with (4) and the production function (2) to compute the price
as
pj =
p
Aj
, (8)
with
p =
[
(1− α)k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
]− σ˜
σ˜−1
×
×
[
(1− α)σ
(
Ak
1−σ
σ˜
σ˜−1
σ−1
0 r
)1−σ
+ ασ (wj)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
Since p is identical for all firms j, prices in the developing country differ only by the
factor 1Aj . Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile between firms within a country
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yielding a wage rate that is equal for all firms. (7) and (8) imply that all firms j
will choose the same capital intensity. The last results is due to the fact that the
local facility pays the same effective interest rate regardless whether it is the object
of contracting out or FDI. The costs and hence the price for producing one unit of a
particular good in the developing country is not guaranteed to be lower than in the
developed country. However, for reason of plausibility, the case of an initially lower
price is analyzed in the following.
With these results at hand, the no arbitrage condition (6) yields the relative capital
intensity of the developing country as
kj
k0
=
[
1− α
α
k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0
1− ( pA)σ−1( p
A
)σ−1 + 1( p
A
)σ−1
]− σ
σ−1
, (9)
which depends on the price measure p of the developing country. To determine this
price measure one has take account of substitution effects due to the consumption
index (3)
p
A
=
(
k0
kj
) 1
ξ−σ
(
A
Aj
) 1−ξ
ξ−σ
(
L
Lj
) 1
ξ−σ
. (10)
From this equation it can be seen as long as developed and developing country’s
goods are more substitutable than capital and labor in the developing country, a
rising relative capital intensity of the developed country increases the price of the
developing country’s good in terms of developed country’s goods. If, as assumed
above, ξ > 1, this is the case here. What also can be seen from this expression that
for pA to be equal for all firms j, the relative employment of capital for two different
firms m and n in the developing country has to fulfill KmKn =
(
Am
An
)ξ
, which char-
acterizes a stable equilibrium in capital allocation in the developing country. Wage
equalization between firms in the developing country leads to the above mentioned
result that the capital intensity in all firms is identical.
From these results it can now be seen how the relative capital intensity of the de-
veloping country reacts to changes in the capital intensity in the developed country,
i.e. if it were to rise as the real interest rate falls. Building the total differential of
(9) with respect to kjk0 and k0 and taking account of the change in the price measure
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p
A via (10) gives
d
kj
k0
dk0
= −σ − 1
σ
(
kj
k0
) 2σ−1
σ
σ˜−1
σ˜
1−α
α
1−p˜
p˜ k
− 1
σ˜
0 − 1p˜2 ∂p˜∂k0
(
1−α
α k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + 1
)
1 + σσ−1
(
kj
k0
) 2σ−1
σ 1
p˜2
∂p˜
∂
kj
k0
(
1−α
α k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + 1
) , (11)
p˜ =
( p
A
)σ−1
> 1,
∂p˜
∂
kj
k0
= −σ − 1
ξ − σ p˜
k0
kj
> 0,
∂p˜
∂k0
=
σ − 1
ξ − σ p˜
1
kj
< 0.
Although (11) is a quite complex expression, some clear insights about the behavior
of the relative capital intensity of the developing country in reaction to an increase
in the capital intensity of the developed country can be gained. The denominator
of (11) is always positive, while the numerator is negative for small values of k0
but becomes positive if k0 is large enough8. This results in a U-shaped profile for
the relative capital intensity of the developing country, kjk0 . At the beginning of
the capital deepening process, the lower elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor leads to weaker growth of the capital intensity in the developing country
than in the developed country. However, during this development, relatively more
developed country goods are produced, inducing an increase in the relative price
of the developing country goods and hence an increase in the marginal product of
capital there which attracts capital into the developing country. At some point
the last effect dominates the first from which the relative capital intensity of the
developing country increases until it reaches the value of one where both countries
enjoy the same capital intensity.
3.3 FDI
The last subsection emphasized the U-shaped profile of the relative capital intensity
of the developing country. This U-shaped profile has direct implications for the
direct investments mentioned above. The interest rate equals the marginal product
8This can be seen from (11) since the first term in the numerator is negative and monotonic
increasing in k0 while the second term is positive and monotonic increasing in k0.
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of investments in the developing country and wages equal the marginal product of
labor
r = pj
Aj
A
f ′(kj)
= pj
Aj
A
(
(1− α)k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
) σ˜
σ˜−1(1− σ˜−1σ˜ σσ−1)
×
×
(
(1− α)
(
kj
k0
)σ−1
σ
k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 + α
) 1
σ−1
(1− α)k
σ˜−1
σ˜
−σ−1
σ
0 k
− 1
σ
j k
σ˜−1
σ˜
−σ−1
σ
0 ,
= pj
Aj
A
f(kj)
1
σ f(ko)
σ−1
σ
− σ˜−1
σ˜ (1− α)k−
1
σ
j
wj = pjAj(f(kj)− f ′(kk)kj)
= pjAjαf(kj)
1
σ f(ko)
σ−1
σ
− σ˜−1
σ˜ .
It then follows that net profits from FDI are positive if
1− α
α
1
µ
(
A
Aj
− 1
)(
kj
k0
)σ−1
σ
k
σ˜−1
σ˜
0 Lj > 0. (12)
The number of workers employed by firm j can readily be computed by observing
that the price measure (10) must be identical for all firms j. This implies that
relative employment of firms m and n is given by
Lm
Ln
=
(
Am
An
)ξ−1
, (13)
implying that the firm with the higher labor augmenting factor has also a higher
absolute employment if ξ > 1. Returning to the net profits from FDI it can be seen
from condition (12) that the U-shaped relationship between kjk0 and k0 has important
implications for the question whether to contract out production or to directly invest
in the developing country. As capital deepens in the developed country as the interest
rate falls the net profits from FDI first strictly increase. This means that at this
early stage of development the incentive to prefer FDI over contracting out first
gains but eventually falls when the capital intensity of the developed country is
high. The incentive is higher if the gap in the labor augmenting factor between the
developed and the developing country is high, i.e. if the comparative advantage for
direct investments over traditional investments is large. However, if the firm in the
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developing country has a high labor augmenting factor it attracts much labor at
the going wage rate, increasing the net profits. Thus there is a trade off between
a low labor augmenting factor, and a high gap to the developed country, and high
labor augmenting factor and high employment. Thus at least a decreasing marginal
profitability from capital deepening occurs if profitability is not inverted U-shaped,
meaning that first more and more firms find it profitable to pursue FDI and might
be switching back later to contracting out.
3.4 Inequality
There are some implications of the production function (2) for inequality in several
economic figures. First, as already mentioned there might be a U-shaped devel-
opment of the relative capital intensity as just shows. Second, this pattern has
implications for other figures such as relative wages or per capita production.
Relative wages, in terms of the developed country’s good, for the developing country,
wj
w can be computed using (6) as
wj
w
=
pjAj(f(kj)− f ′(kj)kj)
A(f(k0)− f ′(k0)k0)
=
(
kj
k0
) 1
σ
.
Thus, the U-shaped relationship carries over to the relative wage from the same
reasons as above.
Relative per capita production in terms of the developed country’s good, pjAjf(kj)Af(k0)
is given by
pjAjf(kj)
Af(k0)
=
kj
k0
p1−σj
(
A
Aj
)σ
=
(
kj
k0
) ξ−1
ξ−σ
(
Aj
A
) (1−σ)(ξ−1)
ξ−σ
(
Lj
L
)σ−1
ξ−σ
.
If, as assumed, ξ > 1, the U-shaped profile also applies to per capita production
during a phase of capital deepening in the developed country. Together with (13)
it can be seen that per capita production across firms in the developing country is
identical.
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4 Conclusion
The motivation for this paper came from the empirical observation that the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor is significantly larger than one for
developed and smaller for developing countries. Economic intuition already implies
that this has implications for inequality in the capital intensities of both types of
countries, i.e. that if the capital intensity of the developed country increases it can
not do this in developing countries that much.
The paper proposed a production function which can account for two different elas-
ticities of substitution between capital and labor. Due to choice of technology, the
developed country can enjoy the higher elasticity of substitution while the devel-
oping country can not. This has important implications for a variety of economic
issues. The paper’s focus is on direct investments of firms active in the developed
country for which the relative capital intensity of the developing country is very
important. The reason for the inverted U-shaped profile of net profits for FDI in the
developing country is the deteriorating effect of capital deepening in the developed
country for the ratio of the interest rate to wages in the developing country. The
relative decline in capital intensities lets the wage decrease relative to the interest
rate which are basis for profits of FDI while the former determine the costs of FDI.
This makes FDI more profitable so that more and more firms engage in FDI. From
some point on this relationship turns around and FDI gets less profitable.
It has also been shown that capital deepening has initially adverse effects via the
lower elasticity of substitution in the developing country onto relative wages and
relative per capita production which are driven by the decline in the relative capital
intensity. However also this relationship has a turning point and therefore inequality
vanishes again over time.
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